Sodus Cold Storage: fire, explosion, evacuation

North Rose is a small hamlet in the Town of Rose, roughly ten miles south of Lake Ontario and midway between Rochester and Syracuse. In 1983 it was home to about 750 citizens.

The fire began during the lunch hour — thankfully, no employees or contractors were inside. It was triggered by the ignition of polyurethane insulation being sprayed within a large refrigerated storage space. The conflagration released heavy black smoke on two separate occasions, along with unknown toxic chemicals, as the event progressed over the next several hours.

Town Supervisor Joseph DeAngelis, in consultation with the NRFD fire chief and incident commander, concurred that evacuation of the community was the appropriate course of action. First responders and law enforcement executed the evacuation shortly after the initial response; many residents sheltered at North Rose–Wolcott High School. Mutual aid came from across Wayne County, and federal and local authorities from many agencies took part in the post-analysis.

Chief Charles Tompkins commanded the scene, supported by Wayne County Fire Coordinator Rick Bond. The incident required an "all hands" mutual aid response including Rose, Clyde, Lyons, Newark and Wolcott, among other neighboring companies. On arrival, extensive black smoke was pouring from the building.

At one point the Newark fire department deployed a large ventilation fan on the assumption that the fire had been contained. The fire then flashed over, producing an explosion and an extreme release of black smoke that engulfed personnel and equipment under a blanket of soot and debris.

"This was demoralizing for the crews battling to control the situation."

First Assistant Chief Bobby Guthrie and Second Assistant Chief Ed Thomas provided direct support managing the fire scene and resource deployment.

First Aid Captain Kenan Baldridge staged a triage center on Railroad Avenue in front of what would have been member Gale Anthony's. David Guthrie was overtaken at the scene; several members required follow-up care and transport to local hospitals — including Chief Tompkins himself, who displayed excessively high heart rates.

The Department of Environmental Conservation expressed alarm at the considerable amount of water used and the potential environmental impact. Studies measured and monitored groundwater for toxic chemicals and particulate matter. The spill report recorded diphenylmethane diisocyanate as a hazardous material and noted that a state of emergency had been declared.

"A fire and explosion on the 2nd floor of the cold storage company resulted in toxic fumes and contaminated water used in fighting the fire. Groundwater may have been affected. Will test for possible effects."

Officials struggled to characterize the exposure. Ken Fanfoni of the state Health Department's Geneva office said soot samples had not been analyzed because officials did not know what chemicals to look for. Gene Burns of the Chemical Transport Emergency Center in Washington criticized that reasoning: "the thing I find totally illogical is someone saying they can't analyze a sample because they don't know what to look for." Dr. John Hawley of the state Health Department did not believe a public health hazard existed in the hamlet, and the Department of Agriculture and Markets later determined that hundreds of thousands of pounds of stored cheese and butter — including two million pounds of Kraft cheddar — were safe for consumption.

Bill Bishop, the owner in 1983, recalled in an April 2026 conversation that both elevator shafts and elevators were completely replaced. "We actually came out of that mess pretty well. It took five years to fully settle with the insurance companies." The storage was down only a few days, no product was lost, and testing on the ash produced the comment that there were more dangerous substances in a household fireplace. Local merchants were less fortunate: their businesses were closed for days.

More than thirty firefighters, plant workers, and residents were felled by the fumes. Myers Community Hospital in Sodus treated and released 35 people; Newark-Wayne Community Hospital treated and released seven. Both hospitals went to a disaster alert, calling in off-duty staff, borrowing personnel for the emergency room, and taking in extra stretchers and linens while volunteers directed traffic and family members.

Victims described headaches, nausea, dizziness, weakness, shortness of breath, burning throats, and upset stomachs; many who took in large amounts of the gas vomited. Carol Beidue of the North Rose Emergency First Aid Crew helped coordinate crews from nine Wayne County towns. Heat and fatigue took their own toll. Nursing supervisors advised patients "what to look for, and to come back if they have trouble breathing."

State officials identified the smoke as carrying methylene diphenyl isocyanate and trichlorofluoromethane. Ken Fanfoni of the state Health Department's Geneva office said fumes from the charred insulation ran roughly five times the recommended safe levels and could be fatal in large volumes: "If you can smell the fumes, the dosage is approximately five times higher than recommended safe levels." With some 40,000 gallons of contaminated water still standing in the building, he pressed to keep the evacuation in place — "Until the water is removed there is no chance the fumes will disappear."

The insulation's manufacturer disagreed sharply. Gary Ruckle, vice president of FSC of Riverside, California, said the product consisted of polymeric isocyanate and polyurethane, approved by Underwriters Laboratories and meeting state and federal safety standards: "They're no more toxic than a can of aerosol." Gene Burns, speaking for the Chemical Manufacturers Association's chemical information service, argued local officials had confused polymeric isocyanate with lethal forms of isocyanate.

"I can't believe that they would evacuate 750 people because they think some water has polymeric isocyanate in it. Calling polymeric isocyanate toxic is like calling table salt acid."

Vincent J. Brigante, vice president of hazardous material operations for the cleanup contractor, reported that readings inside the warehouse showed only slightly elevated ammonia — "probably from leaky freezers."

Bruce Finster, senior sanitary engineer for the DEC's East Avon office, recommended that everything inside the building be treated as hazardous waste — meaning removal by a licensed disposal company. Cecos International of Niagara Falls and New England Pollution Control of Batavia were hired. Two shifts of ten worked around the clock from about 7:30 p.m. Tuesday in protective clothing and air masks.

Three 5,000-gallon tankers hauled fire water to SCA Chemical Services Inc. at Model City, near Niagara Falls, where it would be filtered and the resin buried; charred insulation and debris followed by dump truck to the same secured site. Of the 125,000 gallons of water used on the fire, about 15,000 were pumped out and treated; the rest vaporized or soaked into the ground. Brigante put the cleanup at $25,000 to $30,000.

Because water samples drawn inside the building contained some thirty compounds considered potentially dangerous, the DEC ordered four test wells drilled 40 to 60 feet from the plant, ranging from 20 to 35 feet deep, at a total cost of $4,100. Drilling began that Friday to learn whether the fire water had seeped into the ground and reached the hamlet's supply.

State geologists reported that the North Rose water table slopes north, away from the municipal wells — one about three miles northeast of the plant, the other roughly a mile south — whose water is tested, treated, and held in a 400,000-gallon reservoir before reaching homes. DEC sanitary engineer Mary Jane Peachy said it was unlikely fire water would reach them.

"North Rose water: not contaminated." Preliminary groundwater results three weeks after the fire found no contamination, and the state Health Department confirmed the finding.

By August 9, state and local fire inspectors and insurance adjusters had spent more than a week in the burned-out second floor without agreement. "At this time we still haven't been able to agree on what exactly caused the fire. About the only thing we know is that there was an explosion of some sort," said Fire Coordinator Rick Bond. Fans, lights, and other electrical items from the charred area were removed and locked in storage cabinets, to be examined jointly for signs of an electrical malfunction; other state officials suspected the insulation being sprayed on the walls.

Three 10,000-square-foot storage areas were about half full at the time; the second floor was empty because it was being converted into a freezer. Assistant Chief Robert Guthrie noted that the two adjoining elevator shafts had channeled the fire away from the third and fourth floors, which were only lightly scorched near the doors. No official damage estimate was issued, but Bond put fire damage between $5 million and $10 million, with both elevator shafts to be replaced and the second floor needing extensive repair.